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We investigate how discretionary investments in general and speciﬁc human capital are
aﬀected by the possibility of layoﬀs. After investments are made, ﬁrms may have to lay oﬀ
workers, and will do so in inverse order of the proﬁt that each worker generates. Greater
skill investments, especially in speciﬁc human capital contribute more to a ﬁrm’s bottom line,
so that workers who make those investments will be laid oﬀ last. We show that, as long as
workers’ bargaining positions are not too weak, to reduce layoﬀ probabilities, workers invest in
speciﬁc human capital. Indeed, workers over-invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective
whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any
investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are aﬀected by
the distribution of worker abilities within ﬁrms, the probability that a ﬁrm downsizes, and the
distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.
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How does a ﬁrm convince its workforce to invest enough in human capital, and speciﬁc human
capital in particular? This question has received attention since the seminal work of Becker (1964).
The conundrum is that workers incur all of the investment costs, but capture only a fraction of
the returns to the investment. Several theoretical papers detail contract forms or informational
settings that induce workers to invest in speciﬁc skills. For example, Kahn and Huberman (1988)
and Waldman (1990) investigate “up-or-out” contracts; Zabojnik (1998) considers sales-based com-
pensation; and Carmichael (1983), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Prendergast (1993), Bernhardt and
Scoones (1998), Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and (2003), and Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) in-
vestigate promotion ladders and the wage consequences of information revealed through placement.
In this paper, we identify a new factor that enters the calculus driving a worker’s human capital
investments: when ﬁrms receive adverse shocks that cause them to lay oﬀ workers, they will lay oﬀ
those workers who add the least to the bottom line, retaining workers who generate greater prof-
its.1 While transferable general skills strengthen a worker’s outside option, and are more valued
by a ﬁred worker, workers must also internalize how the types and magnitudes of human capital
investments aﬀect the proﬁts their employer derives from them, and hence their layoﬀ probabilities.
A worker must further determine how investments by other workers aﬀect layoﬀ probabilities, as
the human capital investments by one worker aﬀect not only that worker’s wages and chances for
continued employment, but also the employment opportunities of other workers.
We derive how equilibrium skill investments depend on the distribution of worker abilities in the
ﬁrm, and the probability that workers are laid oﬀ. To emphasize how the rat race to avoid being
ﬁred aﬀects human capital investments, we assume skills are either fully speciﬁc or fully general,
and that both form of human capital are perfect substitutes in production if a worker remains at
his employer. Because workers may be laid oﬀ, therefore, it is never socially optimal to invest in
speciﬁc capital. Nonetheless, workers may do precisely that.
We consider an economy where wages are determined through worker-ﬁrm bargaining. Workers
make their speciﬁc and general human capital investments taking into account how these invest-
ments aﬀect both their probability of being retained by an employer and the possible outcomes
from wage bargaining. In classical bargaining frameworks (Grout (1984), Chang and Wang (1996),
Zabojnik (1998), or Stole and Zweibel (1996)), workers under-invest in human capital in general,
1We focus on environments in which workers bear the costs (eﬀort or monetary) of human capital investments.
For analyses in which ﬁrms bear the costs, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999), or Kessler and L¨ ulfesmann (2004).
1and speciﬁc human capital in particular, because they share the return with the ﬁrm, but incur all
costs. That this under-investment incentive with bargaining should cause workers to under-invest
seems compelling. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that as long as workers’ bargaining positions are not too
weak, workers acquire more human capital than is socially optimal. The under-investment incentive
associated with sharing the returns to human capital is still present in our environment, but the rat
race to reduce layoﬀ probabilities provides workers with overwhelming countervailing incentives to
make excessive human capital investments. Workers understand that ﬁrms will layoﬀ employees in
inverse order of proﬁtability, and that greater investments in human capital (especially in speciﬁc
capital), contribute to the ﬁrm’s bottom line via wage-bargaining.
We derive the following results:
• If human capital investments are quite costly so that a worker’s total human capital invest-
ment is small, then workers distort investments toward speciﬁc skills and over-invest in total
skill acquisition. This is because the beneﬁt from keeping a job dominates the cost of a weaker
bargaining position on a slight human capital investment—the rat race incentives dominate
the standard bargaining incentive in determining investments.
• If human capital investments are less costly so that workers invest more, workers over-invest,
but they allocate a greater share of their investments toward general skills.
• As human capital investments become suﬃciently cheap, workers cease to invest in speciﬁc
skills (dominated by assumption), but they still over-invest in general skills.
• Only when human capital investment is inexpensive does the standard bargaining incentive
eﬀect dominate so that workers under-invest in skill development.
These human capital investment patterns are generated by the rat race incentives within a ﬁrm.
We also characterize how economy-wide market conditions aﬀect worker investments. For example,
if economy-wide conditions are such that the expected general skill investments of workers searching
for jobs is higher, then this improves the outside option at a given ﬁrm, reducing compensation
for skill investments. Because the beneﬁt of being retained by a ﬁrm is reduced, workers shift
investments from speciﬁc to general human capital.
Thus, this paper challenges the conventional wisdom that workers under-invest in human cap-
ital, and speciﬁc skills in particular. Investment in human capital is not easily observable, but
indirect evidence suggests that workers make substantial investments in imperfectly-transferable
2skills. Empirical work dating back to Parsons (1972) emphasizes the relevance of speciﬁc capital.
Topel (1991) and others suggested that one way to measure speciﬁc human capital investment was
to look at the wage reduction faced by displaced workers. Using PSID data, he found that a male
worker in the US with ten years of seniority would suﬀer a wage reduction of up to twenty ﬁve
percent upon separation. This is also feature of our model; wage grows with seniority, and workers
who lose their jobs receive reduced wages due to the loss of speciﬁc human capital. More recently,
researchers (e.g., Neal (1995), Parent (2000), Kambourov and Manovskii (2005), Lazear (2003))
have focused on industry or occupation speciﬁc skill acquisition, highlighting the importance of
industry or occupation experience. The qualitative predictions of our model extend routinely if we
interpret “ﬁrm speciﬁc” skills as industry or occupation speciﬁc skills—in the sense that workers
extract a smaller share of the investment in less-transferable skills (e.g., because laid oﬀ workers
may end up working in another industry or occupation). In fact, workers frequently change industry
or occupation. Neal (1995) (using CPS data) and Parent (2000) (using NLSY data) both ﬁnd that
more than 60% of displaced workers switch (one-digit) industries, numbers that rise to 80% at the
three-digit industry level. Kambourov and Manovskii (2005) ﬁnd that switching occupation is also
frequent; 56 (74) percent of laid oﬀ worker switch occupation using one (three) digit deﬁnitions.
Other indirect evidence of the human capital investment pattern suggested by our paper is that
in regions with high employment rates, workers are often highly specialized, with low levels of gen-
eral education. For example, the correlation between regional unemployment rate and regional high
school graduation rates in Canada is -0.39 and drops to -0.58 for the Atlantic provinces (Canadian
Census Data, 1991). So, too, in Europe, where unemployment rates are signiﬁcantly higher and
search takes far longer, workers make greater ﬁrm speciﬁc skill investments and greater occupation-
speciﬁc skill investments (e.g., apprenticeships). Other research emphasizing excessive investments
by workers includes Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996), who argue that young lawyers work (in-
eﬃciently) long hours to signal their willingness to work hard in the future. Our paper identiﬁes an
important, distinct countervailing force to other under-investment sources, a force that researchers
should account for.
There is a large literature (e.g., Becker (1964), Bernhardt and Scoones (1998) or Gibbons and
Waldman (1999), Bai and Wang (2003)) on human capital investment by workers when there are
constant returns to scale in the ﬁrm, so that a worker’s productivity does not depend on how many
other workers are employed nor on their abilities. A common feature of these models is that when
human capital acquisition is not veriﬁable by third parties and hence cannot be contracted on, then
3individuals may not invest in speciﬁc human capital. In particular, post-investment competitive
wages only reﬂect a worker’s value at a competing ﬁrm. Bernhardt and Scoones (1998) show that if
worker ability varies and competing ﬁrms observe the worker’s job placement, but not his skill, then
workers may willingly invest in speciﬁc skills if it raises the probability that they are promoted,
because promotion communicates to competing ﬁrms that the worker is able. Bai and Wang (2003)
show that a worker may invest in speciﬁc human capitalin a setting in which a ﬁrm and worker ﬁrst
strike a wage agreement, then the worker invests, and ﬁnally the worker’s productivity is realized,
with the ﬁrm terminating the agreement if and only if its proﬁt would be negative.
In our paper, we characterize the human capital investment game between workers as a rat
race, as workers alter their human capital investments in the hope of not being laid oﬀ, which is
similar to winning a prizes. Akerlof (1976) was the ﬁrst to formalize the idea of rat races. Since
then, rat races have been used in many contexts; from labor market decisions to patent races.
Finally, there is a large literature on internal labor market tournaments, where compensation
also depends on relative performance (see e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Carmichael (1983), Pren-
dergast (1993), Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), Gibbons and Waldman (1999)).2 Our environment
can be interpreted as a tournament whose equilibrium structure is endogenously determined in a
decentralized fashion by the actions of the entire workforce. The probability a worker is retained
by the ﬁrm depends on both the worker’s action and those of his cohort. The equilibrium need not
have desirable welfare properties. For example, when speciﬁc and general skills are perfect substi-
tutes within a ﬁrm, industry output is always lower when workers acquire speciﬁc skills, because
some workers will be laid oﬀ and their productivity elsewhere will be reduced. Another way in
which this endogenous tournament diﬀers qualitatively from standard promotion tournaments is
that selection is from the bottom of which few workers to ﬁre, rather than from the top, of which
few workers to promote.
We next present and analyze the model in Section 2, characterizing how human capital invest-
ments depend on the economic environment. Section 3 discusses extensions and policy implica-
tions. For example, if the layoﬀ rate race would signiﬁcantly distort human capital investments,
then union-negotiated seniority-based layoﬀ rules that reduce a ﬁrm’s discretion over whom to lay
oﬀ may dominate the equilibrium outcomes that we analyze. Section 4 concludes.
2We can modify our model so that a worker can take actions that make herself “indispensable”, by reducing the
productivity of co-workers if she is not there. Such investments are not sabotage, but are socially unproductive,
as workers will be laid oﬀ. The literature on inﬂuence activities (Milgrom (1988), Schaefer (1998) and Repenning
(2000)) is also related.
42 The economy
We consider a two-period economy without discounting, an environment rich enough to capture
key features. The economy has many ex-ante identical, risk-neutral ﬁrms, and a continuum of
risk-neutral workers. Each worker has one unit of labor that she can costlessly supply to the ﬁrm
of her choice. Each ﬁrm initially has a measure one of job slots in which it can productively employ
workers, and for simplicity we assume that the ﬁrst period is characterized by full employment.
A worker’s productivity depends on her human capital, her ability, and her employer. Workers
start period one with a common level of transferable general capital of G1. During period one,
workers can make costly discretionary investments in both speciﬁc and general human capital that
aﬀect their second-period productivities. The productivity of a human capital investment depends
on a worker’s ability. A worker with ability a who invests g in general skills develops second-period
transferable general human capital of g2 = G2 +ag, where G2 ≥ G1 captures any passive learning-
by-doing that occurs in the ﬁrst period. Similarly, a speciﬁc capital investment of s gives rise to
speciﬁc human capital of as. Hence, the second-period productivity of a worker with ability a at
her period-one employer is G2 + a(s + g), while her productivity at another ﬁrm is only G2 + ag.
Workers do not know their abilities when they invest. Workers’ abilities are distributed according to
a common probability density function f(·) with support [a,¯ a], where a > 0. There is no aggregate
uncertainty so that the realized distribution of worker abilities at each ﬁrm is f(·). To avoid having
to deal with self-selection problem, we assume that workers do not know their actual ability when
making their investment decision. A possible interpretation this assumption, is that workers are
not aware of how good will they be at acquiring new skills. At the end of the ﬁrst period, worker
investments and abilities are publicly revealed.
To highlight the strategic eﬀects of layoﬀs on human capital investments, we assume that the
total cost to a worker of investments (g,s) is c(g+s). Hence, it is Pareto optimal to invest solely in
general capital: the speciﬁc skill investment of a worker who leaves an employer is wasted. The cost
function has the standard properties: c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0, c00(·) > 0, and limg+s→∞c0(g + s) = ∞.
At the beginning of date 2, each ﬁrm may be hit with a random employment shock λ ≥ 0; and
in such an event, the ﬁrm must layoﬀ fraction λ of its workers.3 We assume that the distribution
over employment shocks, H(λ), is the same at all ﬁrms. Note that this distribution function can
be such that positive weight is put on λ = 0, so some ﬁrm may not have to layoﬀ any workers.
3The implicit production technology is a Leontief technology in which a fraction λ of a ﬁrm’s machines are
destroyed. The qualitative properties of our analysis do not depend on this simplifying assumption.
5Laid-oﬀ workers must search to ﬁnd jobs and wages are determined through bargaining. With no
aggregate uncertainty, a fraction L = E[λ] of workers are laid oﬀ in the economy. Laid-oﬀ workers
can seek employment elsewhere and there are N
L new job openings per laid oﬀ worker. Fraction ρ
of ﬁrms with openings ﬁnd searching workers, so that the probability a worker ﬁnds a ﬁrm with
an open slot is P =
ρN
L < 1. A worker who does not ﬁnd an new job receives a payoﬀ of u. This
beneﬁt u can be interpreted as a combination of home production plus unemployment insurance.
A worker’s second-period wage is determined in a one-on-one bargaining session with an em-
ployer. A worker’s alternative is to quit and search for a new job; and a ﬁrm’s alternative is to cease
bargaining and search to ﬁll its vacancy with another worker. Workers receive a share α ∈ (0,1)
of the surplus created. Because wage negotiations are on an individual worker-ﬁrm basis, a ﬁrm
cannot use wage oﬀers to one worker to extract surplus from other workers. As a result, after ﬁrms
realize employment shocks and observe their employees’ human capital investments and abilities,
a ﬁrm with a layoﬀ shock λ lays oﬀ the measure λ of workers that contribute least to its bottom
line, or equivalently oﬀers low wages that induce these workers to quit. We let w2(a,g,s) be the
yet-to-be-determined equilibrium wage of a retained worker with ability a who invests g in general
skills and s in speciﬁc human capital.
Workers who are laid oﬀ or who fail to reach an agreement on wages search for new jobs. Firms
with job openings seek workers.4 If a searching worker and ﬁrm meet, they bargain over wages, with
workers again receiving share α of the surplus. If a worker and ﬁrm fail to reach an agreement, the
worker remains unemployed and receives unemployment beneﬁt u, and the ﬁrm has an open job slot
that generates no income. We assume that u < G2, so that the unemployment beneﬁt is less than
the productivity of a worker who does not invest in general skills. As a result, there is always sur-
plus over which a laid-oﬀ worker and ﬁrm can bargain. We let ˆ w2(a,g) be the yet-to-be-determined
equilibrium wage of a searching worker with ability a who invested g in general human capital.
Eﬃcient Investment. To maintain comparisons with the symmetric investment equilibrium, we
determine the investment choice by a social planner who must choose a common investment for
all workers in a ﬁrm.5 It is socially eﬃcient to invest solely in general skills. Given λ, a ﬁrm will
layoﬀ all workers with ability levels a < a(λ), where a(λ) = F−1(λ). The surplus generated by an
4The new job openings can be attributed to new ﬁrms, or to existing ﬁrms that expand (λ < 0).
5Equilibrium is characterized by symmetric investments if and only if there is suﬃcient heterogeneity in worker
abilities. See footnote 7.












The ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the socially optimal investment can be written as








The ﬁrst-order condition equates the marginal beneﬁt of investing in general human capital—the
expected marginal return on the investment E[a] minus the loss associated with being laid oﬀ and
not ﬁnding a job—with the marginal cost of the investment.
Second Period Wages. We solve recursively for equilibrium outcomes. Consider ﬁrst the bargain
struck between a searching worker and ﬁrm. The surplus over which a worker and ﬁrm bargain
depends on the worker’s general human capital investment. A worker with ability a who developed
general skills g generates output of G2+ag. Bargaining provides a searching worker with a wage of
ˆ w2(a,g) = α[G2 + ag − u] + u,
and leaves the ﬁrm with a proﬁt of
ˆ π2(a,g) = (1 − α)[G2 + ag − u].
The wages and proﬁts generated by successful search determine the threat points for workers and
employers in their initial second-period bargaining session. The threat points are determined by
integrating over the possible employment outcomes. The threat point of a worker with ability a
who invested g in general human capital is
Zw(a,g) = P ˆ w2(a,g)+ (1 − P)u
= Pα[G2 + ag − u] + u
≡ z0 + αPag, (2)
where z0 = Pα(G2 − u) + u.
If a ﬁrm does not reach agreement with a worker, then it has a job vacancy that may be ﬁlled by
a searching worker. A ﬁrm’s threat point corresponds to the expected proﬁt generated by an open
slot. In turn, this threat point depends on the equilibrium mix of skill investments and ability levels
of searching workers. A ﬁrm ﬁnds a potential hire with probability ρ, and G2+E[ag|laidoﬀ] ≡ G2+ν
is the expected productivity of a laid-oﬀ worker. It follows that a ﬁrm’s threat point is given by
Zf = (1 − α)ρ[G2 + ν − u].
7A worker’ threat point is increasing in her general skill investment, the unemployment alter-
native u, her bargaining power α, and the probability P of successful search. Conversely, a ﬁrm’s
threat point is decreasing in u, but is increasing in the general human capital investments made
throughout the economy by workers. These threat points determine equilibrium wages. The wage
outcome of bargaining between a ﬁrm and a worker with ability a who made a general human
capital investment g and speciﬁc skill investment s is:
w2(a,g,s) = α[G2 + ag + as − Zf − Zw(a,g)]+ Zw(a,g)
≡ w0(Zf,u) + α[1 + (1 − α)P]ag + αas, (3)
where w0(Zf,u) is a constant, α[1 +(1−α)P] is the contribution of general skills to wages, and α
is the contribution of speciﬁc skills. We index w0 by Zf and u to emphasize that it is decreasing
in Zf—and, in particular, the general human capital investments made outside the ﬁrm—and is
increasing in u. In particular, workers internalize how their human capital investments aﬀect their
own threat points, but do not internalize the consequences for the threat points of other agents.
A worker’s wage rises with her bargaining power and with factors that improve her bargaining
position relative to the ﬁrm’s.
Having solved for second period wages as a function of ability and human capital investments,
we can solve for ﬁrm proﬁts:
(1 − α)[G2 + ag + as − Zf − Zw(a,g)]+ Zf.
From the perspective of a worker with skill a, the proﬁts of her employer from a human capital
investment (g,s) equal (1−α)a[g+s−Pαg] plus a constant. In particular, ﬁxing the total investment
in human capital g+s, a ﬁrm earns more from a worker who acquired more speciﬁc human capital.
Also, the more likely a worker is to ﬁnd a new job, the more a worker extracts in bargaining from
an investment in general skills, and hence the greater is the diﬀerence in ﬁrm proﬁts from investing
in speciﬁc rather than general skills. That is, while both wages and proﬁts rise with a, g and s, the
ﬁrm extracts a greater share of the investment in speciﬁc skills than general skills, as competing
ﬁrms only value general skill investments.
Equilibrium Human Capital Investments. Once layoﬀ shocks are revealed, each ﬁrm chooses
which workers to ﬁre, laying oﬀ those workers who generate the least proﬁts. A worker’s ability
and skill development aﬀect a ﬁrm’s proﬁts according to (1−α)a[g+s−Pαg]. At a ﬁrm that must
layoﬀ a proportion λ of its workforce, let x(λ) be the minimum level of a(1 − α)[(1 − αP)g + s]
8such that the ﬁrm retains the worker. That is, a worker with ability a and skill investments (g,s)
is retained if and only if a(1 − α)[(1 − αP)g + s] ≥ x(λ). That is, the standard x(λ) is such that
the measure of workers who fail to meet the standard is λ.
We ﬁrst characterize equilibria within a ﬁrm, given the mix of skill investments throughout the
economy that determine the threat point Zf for the ﬁrm.6 A worker’s expected payoﬀ from human























[w0 + α[1 + (1 − α)P]ag + αas]f(a)da
￿
H(dλ)− c(g + s).
In a symmetric equilibrium in which all workers in a ﬁrm make the same human capital in-
vestments, the only diﬀerences in the proﬁts that workers within a ﬁrm generate are due to their
diﬀerent abilities.7 As a result, a ﬁrm that lays oﬀ lays oﬀ a fraction λ of its workforce, lays oﬀ all
workers with abilities a ≤ a(λ), where a(λ) = F−1(λ).
Only general human capital. To highlight how layoﬀ rat race incentives aﬀect human capital
investments, we ﬁrst suppose that speciﬁc human capital is completely unproductive. This allows
us to focus on the total human capital investment, and permits clean comparisons with the socially




























f as a parameter, we will characterize asymmetric settings, in which ﬁrms diﬀer in their likelihoods of
laying oﬀ workers, which, in turn, gives rise to heterogeneity in human capital investments across ﬁrms.
7The symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if workers diﬀer suﬃciently in ability. With too little heterogeneity
in worker abilities, rat race incentives are so strong (because a marginal investment lets a worker pass “too many”
ability types in the race to avoid layoﬀs) that investments are driven so high that some workers drop out of the race,
and accept that they will be the ﬁrst to be ﬁred. Most starkly, if workers had identical abilities, a worker could
guarantee retention by investing marginally more than other workers, so there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium.
As long as there is enough heterogeneity, investments are characterized by common ﬁrst-order conditions, so that
only the symmetric equilibrium exists.















Comparing the equilibrium investment with the social optimum (equation (??)), reveals the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 1: As α → 1, the equilibrium human capital investment exceeds the socially optimal
investment.
Proof: The result follows directly from the fact that the ﬁrst two terms on the left-hand sides of
equations (??) and (??) correspond, but the last term in (??) is positive and has no analogue in
(??).
This last term in (??) reﬂects the internal rat race between workers in the ﬁrm that arises when
there is positive unemployment. A fraction E[λ](1− P) of workers will be unable to ﬁnd jobs, no
matter what human capital investments are made. Socially, it is not optimal for workers to increase
skill investments in order to raise the probability other workers are laid oﬀ in their place. Privately,
however, workers internalize the fact that if they invest more, then they are less likely to be left
unemployed and receiving only the unemployment beneﬁt, u: a marginally greater investment in
general skills marginally reduces by
a(λ)
g the layoﬀ probability at a ﬁrm that must layoﬀ fraction λ
of its labor force, and (G2 + a(λ)g − u) is the gain from escaping the layoﬀ. As a result of this rat
race, workers invest more than is socially optimal.
The comparative statics are straightforward. Diﬀerentiation reveals the following:
α: Investment is increasing in a worker’s bargaining power: each of the three terms on the right-
hand side of equation (??) is increasing in α. If α is reduced, workers receive a smaller share
of any investment, but still incur all of the cost, and hence reduce their investments. As a
result, skill investments exceed the social optimum if and only if α is suﬃciently large.
H(λ): As long as the density of worker abilities does not decline too quickly, i.e., f0(·) is not too
negative,8 then taking market conditions outside the ﬁrm as given, when layoﬀs within a ﬁrm














0(a(λ)) is positive as long as f
0(·) is not too negative.
10Zf: Investment is decreasing in the strength of the ﬁrm bargaining position. Most concretely, if
workers outside the ﬁrm invest more, workers inside a ﬁrm invest less.
u: The greater is u, the less workers invest in human capital. Increasing unemployment com-
pensation, u, reduces the cost of being laid oﬀ, and hence induces workers to invest less. In
particular, if workers over-invest in general capital, it may be optimal for the government to
increase unemployment compensation, to reduce the internal rat race incentives within ﬁrms.
¯ a − a: If we impose a uniform distribution on ability, workers invest less in the symmetric equilib-
rium when they are more heterogeneous (¯ a − a is greater). This is because ability is the
primary determinant of who is going to be laid oﬀ.
Productive speciﬁc human capital. If both general and speciﬁc human capital are productive,
the ﬁrst-order conditions describing a worker’s skill investments become:








α[1 + (1 − α)P]af(a)da
+
(1 − αP)a(λ)f(a(λ))








αPλE[a|a < a(λ)] + α[1 + (1 − α)P](1 − λ)E[a|a ≥ a(λ)]
+
(1 − αP)a(λ)f(a(λ))



















α(1 − λ)E[a|a ≥ a(λ)] +
a(λ)f(a(λ))




where the inequalities hold as equalities if the associated investments are strictly positive, and
at least one human capital investment is positive. To understand the content of the ﬁrst-order
conditions, suppose that workers invest in both speciﬁc and general skills. Then equating the















The left-hand side is the marginal gain from a marginal investment in in speciﬁc rather than general
skills. It is the greater marginal impact on the probability the worker is retained by the ﬁrm due to a
speciﬁc human capital investment times the “relative prize” from being retained rather than laid oﬀ.
11The right-hand side is the marginal cost of a speciﬁc rather than the general skill investment. A spe-
ciﬁc investment weakens a worker’s bargaining position with her current employer, and the worker is
less productive when laid oﬀ—the right-hand side is the corresponding marginal reduction in wages.
The right-hand side of (??) does not vary with the human capital investments. Hence, we can
characterize investments in each skill as a function of the total investment, s+g. More speciﬁcally,
consider cost functions of the form βC(s+g). For β large, the marginal cost of human capital invest-
ments is large, so that the equilibrium total investment is small. Inspection of the right-hand sides
of equations (??) and (??), or equivalently of each side of equation (??), yields the following result:
Proposition 2: There exists a ¯ β such that for β ≥ ¯ β discretionary human capital investments are
small and workers invest only in speciﬁc human capital.
Proof: The result follows directly from the fact that the left-hand side of (??) rises monotonically
as s + g falls, going to inﬁnity as s + g → 0, while the right-hand side is constant.
The economic intuition is that if discretionary human capital investments are small, the cost
associated with a weaker bargaining position is slight, but there is a positive prize, (1−P)(G2−u),
from being employed, rather than unemployed. As a result, the intra-ﬁrm rat race to avoid layoﬀs
drives workers to direct all human capital investments ineﬃciently toward ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. A
worker can raise the likelihood of retention either by increasing the overall investment or by tilting
the mix of investment toward speciﬁc skills. When marginal skill investments are more costly, the
worker does better to shift investments toward speciﬁc skills.
If we reduce β, the marginal cost of investment fallsand discretionaryhuman capital investments
rise, which reduces the left-hand side of (??). At ¯ β, equation (??) holds as an equality at g = 0.
Proposition 3: Reducing β further below ¯ β both raises total human capital investments and causes
workers to shift investments toward general skills and away from speciﬁc skills.
Proof: For β < ¯ β, if there are non-trivial investments in speciﬁc and general skills, equation (??)
must hold as an equality: to maintain the equality as s+g rises, investments must be shifted toward
general skills.
The intuition is that as human capital investments are increased, their contributions grow rela-
tive to the non-discretionary component of the prize from being employed, (1−P)(G2−u). Phrased
diﬀerently, there is more foregone compensation to discretionary speciﬁc human capital when the
12investment is large relative to the non-discretionary prize.
Importantly, when workers invest in both skills, they both distort their human capital invest-
ments toward speciﬁc skills and over-invest:
Proposition 4: If workers invest in both speciﬁc and general skills in equilibrium, a worker’s total
investment in human capital s + g is given by c0(s + g) = E[a]. Hence, the worker’s total human
capital investment exceeds the social optimum.

























Finally, as β is reduced further, eventually the marginal costs of human capital investments fall
by so much that workers invest solely in general human capital. In particular, there is a critical
value of s + g such that the left-hand side of (??) just equals the right-hand side at s = 0. Thus,
we have
Proposition 5: There exists an β < ¯ β such that for all β < β workers invest only in general
skills.
In summary, in economies where workers make limited human capital investments, they invest
primarily in speciﬁc skills and over-invest in total skill development. In economies where human
capital investments are higher, an ever greater share of investment is allocated toward general skills.
Economy-wide market conditions. None of this analysis exploits the assumed symmetry across
ﬁrms. It follows that if we take the initial distribution of workers across ﬁrms as given, we can
characterize how human capital investments at one ﬁrm are aﬀected by economy-wide market
conditions. For simplicity, we focus on parameterizations in which workers in a ﬁrm invest in
both ﬁrm speciﬁc and general human capital. Now suppose that for whatever reason, the av-
erage general human capital investments outside the ﬁrm are increased. This raises the threat
point of the employer, Zf, because it increases the value of an open slot. In turn, this reduces
w2(a,g,s)−Zw(a,g) = α[G2 +ag +as−Zf − Zw(a,g)]. Proposition 3 reveals that this change in
Zf does not aﬀect a worker’s total human capital investment. However, to maintain equation (??)
as an equality, it must be that workers within the ﬁrm also shift their human capital investments
toward general skills. Proposition 6 below follows immediately.
Proposition 6: Economy-wide shifts toward general skill investments outside the ﬁrm induce shifts
13toward general investments within the ﬁrm.
Intuitively, if workers in the economy raise general skill investments, a worker has a smaller in-
centive to invest in speciﬁc skills because the beneﬁt to being retained by an employer is reduced.
It follows that the skill-investment externalities that operate at the ﬁrm level, also operate at the
economy-wide level.
3 Extensions and policy implications
Ex-ante heterogeneity in ability. It would be worthwhile to extend our analysis to allow for
ex-ante heterogeneity in worker ability. Wage negotiations lead both worker and ﬁrm to share the
returns to ability so that, ceteris paribus, a more able worker is less likely to be ﬁred. As a result,
more able workers may invest more heavily in general human capital, because the impact on ﬁring
probabilities due to a general rather than speciﬁc skill investment may be less. This diﬀerence in
skill investments also means that an able worker does not mind being ﬁred by as much as a less able
worker. As a result, it could be that more able workers are also more likely to be laid oﬀ—their
greater productivity may be more than oﬀset by the higher wages that they must be paid.
Schooling. In a similar vein it would be useful to consider the choice by individuals of whether
to stay in school and develop general skills, or to drop out and develop speciﬁc skills through on-
the-job training. Results consistent with the ones obtained in Gibbons and Waldman (2003) would
obtain, but for diﬀerent reasons. In particular, schooling would be correlated with wages because
it is chosen by workers who specialize in general human capital, and worker who choose to drop
out of school early specialize in speciﬁc human capital.
Layoﬀs according to seniority. Seniroity rules can have subtle eﬀects in this economy. If worker
are laid oﬀ not according to the relative proﬁts that they generate their employer, but rather by
other arbitrary rules then workers would not distort their human capital investments to avoid lay-
oﬀs. As in Milgrom (1988), decentralization of the decision-making process can lead to ineﬃciency.
In his paper, a worker uses wasteful inﬂuence activities to increase his or her probability of being
retained. In our paper, a worker over-invests in speciﬁc human capital to achieve the same goal.
Plausibly, seniority layoﬀ rules could raise social surplus above the competitive outcome by reducing
discretion in the layoﬀ process, thereby reducing the incentive to manipulate such processes. Obvi-
ously, the distortion introduced by the arbitrary rule would have to be small for such a policy to be
optimal. Importantly, such distortions would be small precisely where variations in ability between
14workersare small, and it is precisely in such environments that the rat race greatly skews worker skill
investments. In such contexts union-negotiated seniority-based layoﬀ rules are likely to be optimal.
Unemployment Insurance. Government intervention may be able to induce workers to make
more eﬃcient investment choices. For example, higher unemployment insurance reduces the cost
of being ﬁred, and may encourage workers to shift investments eﬃciently toward general skills and
away from speciﬁc skills, or to reduce excessive human capital investments. The lower is the proba-
bility of ﬁnding a new job, the more generous the unemployment insurance program would have to
be. This provides an argument in favor of higher unemployment insurance in regions where unem-
ployment is high and it is hard to ﬁnd a job, or when economy-wide unemployment rates are higher.
Our bargaining environment, in which some laid-oﬀ workers fail to ﬁnd jobs, can be modiﬁed
to investigate these issues. Increasing unemployment insurance reduces total investment and shifts
investment toward general skills, away from speciﬁc skills. While we assumed that speciﬁc human
capital is a dominated investment to heighten the contrast with standard under-investment predic-
tions, in reality, some speciﬁc capital investments are clearly socially optimal. The optimal policy
prescription then hinges on whether, in fact, individuals over- or under-invest in speciﬁc capital
and in total human capital acquisition, something that has yet-to-be-determined empirically.
Brown and Kaufold (1988) provide a very diﬀerent model of human capital investment in the
presence of possible unemployment. They argue that risk averse workers will under-invest in human
capital, and that unemployment insurance can increase investment in human capital. Here, we show
that the internal rat race between ﬁrms can cause workers to over-invest in human capital and to
distort investments toward ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and away from general human capital.
Finally, when individuals choose whether to stay in school to acquire general skills, or to drop
out and develop speciﬁc skills on the job, higher UI compensation may induce individuals to stay in
school. Indeed, one can motivate higher unemployment payments in areas where unemployment is
higher, because greater UI payments may induce individuals to make the riskier eﬃcient investment.
4 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the investments by workers in general and speciﬁc human capital when
workers internalize the consequences of their investments for layoﬀ probabilities. Workers under-
stand that ﬁrms will layoﬀ workers in inverse order of proﬁtability. Investing in speciﬁc rather than
general skills reduces the outside value of the worker to competing ﬁrms, thereby committing the
15worker to extracting lower wages through the subsequent wage determination process. As a result,
a worker who invests more in speciﬁc skills than his fellow employees is less likely to be laid oﬀ. The
rat race to avoid being laid oﬀ can induce workers to make costly investments in speciﬁc human
capital and to over-invest in total skill development relative to the social optimum.
More generally, we show that in economies where workers make limited human capital in-
vestments, they invest primarily in speciﬁc skills, while in economies where total human capital
investments are higher, an ever greater share is allocated toward general skills. Finally, we show
that the forces that operate at the ﬁrm level, also operate at the economy level: higher investments
in general human capital at some ﬁrms, drive down wages at other ﬁrms, making it less attractive
for all workers to invest in speciﬁc skills.
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